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PGS, I Love You: Rebuilding 
Copyright for Architecturally-Situated 
Pictorial, Graphic, and Sculptural 
Works 
Llewellyn Kittredge Shamamian* 
Abstract 
Over twenty years ago, in Leicester v. Warner Bros., the 
Ninth Circuit limited copyright protection for a certain 
sculptural complex located within a downtown Los Angeles 
high-rise. The court determined that the sculpture, otherwise 
protected from pictorial reproduction, could be visually 
replicated without infringing on the artist’s copyright because it 
was part of its architectural context.  
This Note explores two recent copyright cases where 
companies capitalized on painted street art, using the works as 
backdrops for social media advertising. The resulting litigation 
calls into question Leicester’s holding and the extent to which it 
may allow visual reproduction of non-sculptural works 
incorporated into architecture. This Note’s introduction 
addresses the rise of legal disputes in the street art community 
and the circumstances of these recent cases. Part II addresses 
fundamentals of domestic copyright law and the varied 
protection for certain forms of authorship. Part III discusses an 
important exception for the visual reproduction of architectural 
works and judicial application of the exception to disputes 
involving painted street art. Part IV argues that Leicester should 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2021, Washington and Lee University School of Law. 
I would like to thank Professor Sarah K. Wiant for her advice and mentorship 
that shaped this Note, and the editors of the Washington and Lee Law Review 
for their guidance during the publication process. I would also like to thank 
my family, whose love of art, architecture, and design inspired this Note. 
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not serve as the legal standard for all such controversies, and 
Part V articulates a clarified inquiry to limit judicial dependency 
on Leicester.  
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I.  Introduction 
Banksy wrote: “copyright is for losers©.”1 Having recently 
pursued a trademark dispute in a European court, Banksy may 
sincerely wish to eschew copyright law in favor of alternative 
intellectual property claims.2 Perhaps—and this is the more 
probable explanation—the comment is meant to be provocative.3 
This intent tracks the artist’s public persona that is both 
instigative and evasive, and, most importantly, the root of his 
notoriety.4 Widely considered among the most famous street 
artists, Banksy ironically holds responsibility for bringing the 
genre mainstream.5 His original work appears on streets across 
the world, from London, Paris, and Vienna to Detroit and San 
Francisco.6 While the ubiquity and public accessibility of his 
 
 1. BANKSY, BANKSY: WALL AND PIECE i (2005). 
 2. See Taylor Dafoe, In a Threat to Banksy’s Empire, an EU Court Rules 
That He Can’t Hold Trademarks While His Identity Remains a Mystery, 
ARTNET (Sept. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/292V-92TE (reporting on Banksy’s 
years-long legal battle with a greeting card company). 
 3. Banksy’s artwork is notoriously outrageous. See, e.g., Scott Reyburn, 
Banksy Painting Self-Destructs after Fetching $1.4 Million at Sotheby’s, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/P3TZ-M856 (describing the auction 
house spectacle). For more on Banksy’s “anti-authoritarian whimsy,” see also 
Lauren Collins, Banksy Was Here: The Invisible Man of Graffiti Art, NEW 
YORKER (May 7, 2007), https://perma.cc/2S2G-ZYWL (discussing the 
important of Banksy’s anonymity). 
 4. When selected for Time magazine’s list of The World’s 100 Most 
Influential People in 2010, he provided the magazine with a picture of himself, 
face covered with a paper bag. See Shepard Fairey, The 2010 Time 100: 
Banksy, TIME MAG. (Apr. 29, 2010), https://perma.cc/H62Z-28ZM (providing 
background on Banksy). The excerpt reads in part: 
Many people recoil at the thought of a guy in a hoodie with a 
spray-paint can and something to say. Others foam at the mouth 
when they see the same guy’s artwork auctioned off for hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. Banksy just laughs at all of it. He has a gift: 
an ability to make almost anyone very uncomfortable. He doesn’t 
ignore boundaries; he crosses them to prove their irrelevance.  
Id. 
 5. See Will Ellsworth-Jones, The Story behind Banksy, SMITHSONIAN 
MAG. (Feb. 2013), https://perma.cc/25EA-M5AQ (describing “the phenomenon 
that has come to be known as the ‘Banksy effect’—the artist’s astounding 
success in bringing urban, outsider art into the cultural, and increasingly 
profitable, mainstream”).  
 6. See id. (stressing the broad geographical range of Banksy’s work).  
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images are part of a larger commentary on the art world,7 
unauthorized reproductions of these works are also 
widespread.8 Banksy’s recent attempts to enforce ownership 
rights, especially those within the intellectual property sphere, 
have received mixed responses.9 
Whatever their intended effect, Banksy’s words are 
representative of the evolving dynamic between street artists 
and copyright law.10 Historically, street art wore its illegality as 
a badge of infamy.11 This infamy accrued value, leading to the 
recognition of street art as a commodified art form—one that 
has fetched millions at auction and drawn viewers from across 
the world.12 Unprotected, the commodity was exploited.13 
Accordingly, many artists within the genre have turned to 
 
 7. The Smithsonian article offers a quote from Banksy: “[A]ll you need 
now is a few ideas and a broadband connection. This is the first time the 
essentially bourgeois world of art has belonged to the people. We need to make 
it count.” Id. 
 8. See Enrico Bonadio, Banksy Finally Goes to Court to Stop 
Unauthorized Merchandising, despite Saying Copyright Is for Losers, THE 
CONVERSATION (Aug. 9, 2019, 7:28 AM), https://perma.cc/E3KL-EK9F (noting 
the recurrent copying of Banksy’s works). 
 9. See Techdirt, Banksy’s Fake Store is an Attempt to Abuse Trademark 
Law to Avoid Copyright Law, ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc
/U3YB-HPQW (remarking that Banksy’s stance shift on IP law “isn’t very 
anti-commercial”). 
 10. See Enrico Bonadio, Graffiti Copyright Battles Pitch Artists against 
Advertisers, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 9, 2014, 1:02 PM), https://perma.cc
/SZ2R-F9SE (arguing that “[s]treet artists . . . might find in copyright law an 
ally, a friend that can help them in giving added value to their works and 
reacting to ‘art stealers’ and (why not?) making money out of their job, and 
their passion”). 
 11. See Tony Chackal, Of Materiality and Meaning: The Illegality 
Condition in Street Art, 74 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 359, 360 (2016) 
(“[P]olitical cachet became a goal intended by artists over time, and 
many . . . realized that illegality provided a distinctive political dimension to 
works.”). 
 12. See Diana Hubbell, Street Art Has Become a Global Business—And 
Artists Are Worrying Over Its Future, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2018, 10:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/GPP4-RUND (“But commodification changes a medium, 
especially one with radical roots, and some members of the community are 
conflicted about street art’s evolution.”). 
 13. See id. (discussing promotion and profitable use of street art).  
PGS, I LOVE YOU  275 
 
courts to enforce their legal rights.14 While some see the 
deployment of legal tactics as cutting against the public identity 
of street art, others see an opportunity to occupy new territory.15 
This category of legal dispute has increased,16 with some cases 
receiving viral support.17 
The resulting controversies involve a variety of legal issues. 
For example, Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P.,18 one of the most 
famous cases involving the property rights of graffiti artists, 
resulted in a verdict of over $6 million.19 The case concerned the 
expansive 5Pointz complex in Long Island City, Queens, and the 
rights of the artists who—with the permission of the 
owner — transformed the warehouse property with a panoply of 
painted murals.20 When the owner whitewashed the walls of the 
complex, the artists sued under the Visual Artists Rights Act 
 
 14. See Eileen Kinsella, ‘They Had No One in Their Corner’: Meet the 
Lawyer Who is Battling Big Corporations on Behalf of Street Artists, ARTNET 
(Nov. 7, 2019) https://perma.cc/87SW-MEPK (describing the efforts of one 
lawyer to pursue claims on behalf of street artists). 
 15. See generally ANDREA BALDINI, A PHILOSOPHY GUIDE TO STREET ART 
AND THE LAW (2018) (arguing that street art uses its “rebellious attitude” 
toward the law as a creative resource, reshaping its relationship with 
intellectual property).  
 16. See Alan Feuer, G.M. Used Graffiti in a Car Ad. Should the Artist Be 
Paid?, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/SYN6-VKH9 (providing 
examples of recent lawsuits brought by graffiti artists). 
 17. See Enrico Bonadio, Big Brands Ripping Off Street Art Is Not Cool: 
Why Illegal Graffiti Should Be Protected by Copyright, THE CONVERSATION 
(Mar. 16, 2018, 12:01 PM), https://perma.cc/6S65-X346 (reporting on H&M’s 
withdrawal of its lawsuit against street artist Jason “Revok” Williams); see 
also Jenna Amatully, People Are Boycotting H&M Over Alleged Infringement 
of An Artist’s Graffiti, HUFFPOST (Mar. 15, 2018, 18:09 GMT), https://perma.cc
/6PUZ-AAUU (describing backlash against the retailer). This consumer 
reaction comports with the evolving social perception of street art generally. 
See Cathay Y. N. Smith, Street Art: An Analysis under U.S. Intellectual 
Property Law and Intellectual Property’s “Negative Space” Theory, 24 DEPAUL 
J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 259, 260–261 (2013) (describing the shift of 
street art from social nuisance to a form of cultural heritage).  
 18. 320 F. Supp. 3d 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Castillo v. G&M 
Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020).  
 19. See Alan Feuer, Graffiti Artists Awarded $6.7 Million for Destroyed 
5Pointz Murals, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/X2NB-HXBE 
(describing the case as “a decisive victory” for the art world). 
 20. See Lauren Hard, 5 Years Ago, Their 5Pointz Art Was Erased. Now 
There’s a Museum for It, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/WK8S-
XZY5 (providing a description of the 5Pointz complex).  
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(VARA)21 and ultimately prevailed in a New York district 
court.22 Under VARA, the author of a work of “visual art” 
created on or after June 1, 1990 has the right, among others, to 
prevent “any destruction of a work of recognized stature.”23 To 
hold the owner liable under VARA, the court required a showing 
that the graffiti was in fact “of recognized stature,” which the 
plaintiffs were able to demonstrate.24  
The 5Pointz victory signals a shift in the perception 
surrounding this art form. After the City Council granted 
approval to raze the complex to replace it with condominiums, 
the judge, who denied the artists’ request for an injunction to 
block the building’s demolition, reportedly stated: “I love the 
work and it’s going to tear my heart out to see it torn down, but 
as a judge I have to apply the law . . . [t]he building, 
unfortunately, is going to have to come down.”25 The judge 
expressed a similar sentiment in his written order, writing “our 
souls owe a debt of gratitude to the plaintiffs for having brought 
the dusty walls of defendants’ building to life.”26 The Second 
Circuit recently affirmed the district court’s verdict, and the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.27  
Nevertheless, the 5Pointz case is an outlier.28 In fact, the 
majority of potential claims brought by street artists to exercise 
their property rights afforded through their authorship of a 
work settle swiftly, foreclosing the option of litigation for 
 
 21. 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
 22. Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 428. 
 23. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). 
 24. Cohen, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 421. 
 25. Sarah Cascone, It ‘Makes No Sense’: 5Pointz Developer Vows to Appeal 
Landmark Ruling that Favored Graffiti Artists, ARTNET (Feb. 21, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/AZ44-7ZTV. 
 26. Memorandum & Opinion at 23, Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. 
Supp. 3d 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 13-cv-05612), ECF No. 37. 
 27. Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. 
denied, 141 S. Ct. 363 (2020) (mem.); see also Cascone, supra note 25 (reporting 
that the developer is “confident that the appeals court will acknowledge ‘how 
ridiculous this whole things is’”).  
 28. See Feuer, supra note 19 (identifying other graffiti art lawsuits which 
settled contemporaneously with the 5Pointz verdict).   
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would-be plaintiffs.29 The dearth of courtroom victories may 
embolden action by putative infringers, who could otherwise be 
deterred by adverse precedent.30 Moreover, the absence of a 
clear legal standard decreases the options for those artists who 
wish to sue.31 Facing a daunting courtroom battle against a 
corporation with resources to litigate an evolving point of law, 
many artists will choose to settle immediately.32  
This Note focuses on outlier artists whose respective 
courtroom battles with well-known car manufacturers raised 
novel issues at the intersection of street art and copyright. In 
both cases, the manufacturers appropriated the artists’ works 
to use as urban backdrops for their respective social media 
advertising campaigns.33 The resulting litigation compelled two 
district courts to issue opinions during the pre-trial phase on a 
point of law highly relevant to street art: copyright protection 
for an architecturally-fixed painted mural.34 These cases mark 
the first judicial involvement with an issue unpursued in court 
 
 29. See, e.g., Henri Neuendorf, Street Artist Revok and H&M Settle 
Dispute over an Ad That Featured His Work without Permission, ARTNET 
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/S6WM-CQC8 (discussing the lawsuit against 
H&M); Carlos Suarez de Jesus, Aholsniffsglue, American Eagle Outfitters 
Reach Settlement in Copyright Lawsuit, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/5YDE-TLY8 (reporting on American Eagle’s settlement with 
a graffiti artist).  
 30. See Feuer, supra note 19 (describing the issue as “unsettled”). 
 31. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 32. Even street artist Adrian Falkner, who prevailed against General 
Motors on its motion to dismiss, recently settled. See Notice of Settlement at 
2, Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 18-cv-00549 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2018), ECF 
No. 46. 
 33. See generally Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927 (C.D. 
Cal. 2018) (denying summary judgment against General Motors for copyright 
infringement); Mercedes Benz, USA v. Lewis, Nos. 19-10948, 10949, 10951, 
2019 WL 4302769 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2019) (defending Mercedes’ motion for 
declaratory judgment).  
 34. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 931–32 (describing the issue before 
the court); Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769, at *4–5 (examining the issue under 
copyright for architectural works).  
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since 2000.35 Both cases have since settled, foreclosing the 
opportunity for further clarity in this area of the law.36  
The first case involves street artist Adrian Falkner, also 
known as “Smash 137,” and his discovery of an unauthorized 
advertising campaign by General Motors (GM) on social 
media.37 GM’s campaign featured his mural, which was painted 
as part of an art gallery marketing project and adorned the wall 
of a Detroit parking garage.38 Falkner sued GM in the District 
Court for the Central District of California in 2017.39 The court 
ruled in Falkner’s favor on GM’s motion for summary judgment, 
but the case ultimately settled in 2018.40 
The second case concerns a dispute between artists James 
Lewis, Daniel Bombardier, Jeff Soto, Maxx Gramajo and 
Mercedes Benz regarding an advertising campaign on 
Instagram.41 The artists created their respective murals 
between 2015 and 2017, during an annual arts festival known 
as Murals in the Market.42 Mercedes used the murals in the 
backdrop of its G 500 photoshoot.43 Furious, the artists sent 
Mercedes letters through counsel in which they threatened to 
file an infringement suit against Mercedes.44 Mercedes 
responded by filing a suit seeking declaratory judgment, asking 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan to rule 
that the artists possessed no copyright in their works.45 The 
artists unsuccessfully requested that the court dismiss 
 
 35. See infra Part III (discussing sculptor Andrew Leicester’s litigation 
against Warner Brothers).  
 36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also Stipulated Order 
of Dismissal at 1, Mercedes Benz, USA v. Lewis, No. 19-10948 (E.D. Mich. 
June 1, 2020), ECF No. 48 (dismissing the action with prejudice). 
 37. Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 929. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 937 (declining General Motors’s copyright infringement 
argument as a matter of law); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769 at *1 (describing the factual 
circumstances of the alleged infringement). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. at *2 (Mercedes requesting, among other things, judicial 
declaration that the artists’ murals are exempt from copyright protection). 
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Mercedes’s declaratory judgment claim.46 The court initially 
refused, and the case remained active until it was voluntarily 
dismissed in June 2020.47 
With respect to the artists’ work, illegality was not at issue 
in either case; rather, the cases centered on promoted street 
artists and the advertisers who reproduced their work without 
permission.48 In both Falkner v. General Motors LLC49 and 
Mercedes Benz, USA v. Lewis,50 the car manufacturers defended 
the infringement claims by asserting that the artists’ works 
were not eligible for copyright protection under the current legal 
scheme and, in doing so, invoked a somewhat novel area of 
copyright law concerning the relationship between painted 
works and architecture.51  
This relationship is legally significant because of the 
distinctive aspects of United States copyright law. One of these 
aspects is the differing degrees of protection offered to certain 
“works of authorship.”52 Painting is considered one form of 
authorship, and it exists in a category of copyrighted material 
referred to as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” (PGS).53 
Architecture occupies its own sphere in copyright law, and 
enjoys comparably limited protection to that of PGS works.54 
 
 46. See id at *5–6 (finding no support for the artists’ position in existing 
case law).   
 47. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 48. See Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 929 (C.D. Cal. 
2018) (clarifying that Falkner was invited to paint on the garage); Mercedes 
Benz, USA v. Lewis, Nos. 19-10948, -10949, -10951, 2019 WL 4302769, at *1 – 2 
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2019) (noting that each mural was created during an arts 
festival). This Note will not address the issue of illegality, which has been 
raised as defense in various copyright suits involving street art. For more on 
this issue, see John Eric Seay, You Look Complicated Today: Representing an 
Illegal Graffiti Artist in a Copyright Infringement Case against a Major 
International Retailer, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75 (2012) (discussing whether 
illegal graffiti is eligible for copyright).  
 49. 393 F. Supp. 3d 927 (C.D. Cal. 2018). 
 50. Nos. 19-10948, -10949, -10951, 2019 WL 4302769 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 
11, 2019). 
 51. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (describing the legal 
context of this issue and the lack of recent case law).  
 52. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (listing categories of “works of authorship”). 
 53. Id. § 102(a)(5).  
 54. See id. §§ 102(a)(8), 120 (creating a new category for architectural 
works and limiting its scope). 
280 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 271 (2021) 
 
While pictorial representations of PGS works are subject to fair 
use analysis, pictorial representations of architectural works 
“ordinarily visible from a public space” are permitted by § 120(a) 
of the Copyright Act, whether or not the representation is fair 
use.55  
Falkner and Lewis analyzed the extent to which the 
pictorial representation exemption for architecture limits the 
copyright protection of a PSG work that is physically connected 
to architecture.56 The two courts came to opposite conclusions: 
Falkner decided that the mural at issue may be entitled to 
copyright protection, notwithstanding the pictorial 
representation exemption,57 while Lewis opined that the same 
provision may be fatal to the artists’ copyright.58 The cases 
unveil a potential class of “losers” in copyright law whose rights 
surrounding reproduction of their work are currently at risk.59 
This Note will argue that certain architecturally-fixed PGS 
works should receive independent copyright protection and will 
propose a test for courts to determine the dividing line that 
separates those works from other forms of authorship within 
copyright law.60  
This Note continues in Part II with an introduction to 
copyright law in the United States and explores principles that 
should underly judicial analysis of copyright issues. Part III 
examines the current judicial interpretation of § 120(a) and its 
effect on copyright protection for PGS works. Part IV argues 
that § 120(a) should not apply to all PGS works that are affixed 
to architecture; rather, courts should apply a test resembling 
that proposed in Part V. The test offers guidance on how to 
create a judicial delineation among PGS works, in order to 
 
 55. See id. §§ 107, 120 (subjecting all copyrightable material to the fair 
use defense but further limiting the scope of protection for architectural works 
only).  
 56. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 930–31 (discussing whether 
protection for that work is limited by § 120(a)); Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769, at 
*5 (considering protection for a PGS work “embodied” in architecture).  
 57. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (distinguishing Falkner’s claim 
from prior case law holding that a PGS work may lose its independent 
copyright protection when affixed to architecture).  
 58. See Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769, at *5 (viewing prior case law as 
unsupportive of the artists’ position).  
 59. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.   
 60. See infra Parts IV and V.  
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prevent exploitation of non-sculptural street art that is clearly 
separate from its architectural canvas. 
II.  Copyright Law and Its Relationship to Architectural 
Works 
United States copyright originates in the Constitution,61 
but the concept of bestowing certain property rights in the 
creator of a work predates the republic.62 While some aspects of 
domestic copyright law emanate from foreign sources, including 
the English common law tradition, the United States differs in 
important respects.63 In fact, an important area of dissimilarity 
is the issue explored in this Note; that is, the effect of copyright 
protection for architectural works on other copyrightable 
subject matter.64 Some additional principles explain the source 
of this incongruity and the context within which Congress 
operated to eventually remedy the dissonance.65 
 
 61. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (charging Congress “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”). 
 62. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 37–77 (1994) (discussing the genesis of copyright law 
within the context of technological revolution in Europe).  
 63. See generally MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF 
COPYRIGHT (1995) (tracing the formation of copyright from eighteenth-century 
Britain); see, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834) (following 
the dissent of Judge Yates interpreting the English Statute of Anne, 8 Ann. C. 
19 (1710) (Eng.)). Judge Yates wrote: 
The labors of an author have certainly a right to a reward: but it 
does not from thence follow, that his reward is to be infinite, and 
never to have an end. Here, it is ascertained. The Legislature have 
fixed the extent of his property: they have allowed him twenty-eight 
years; and have expressly declared, he shall have it no longer. Have 
the Legislature been guilty of injustice? Little cause has an author 
to complain of injustice, after he has enjoyed a monopoly for 
twenty-eight years, and the manuscript still remains his own 
property.  
Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 232 (Yates, J. dissenting).  
 64. See infra Part III. 
 65. See infra Part II.B. 
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A.  Guiding Principles 
Adherence to aesthetic objectivity underpins copyright law 
in the United States.66 Aesthetic objectivity is not to be confused 
with the requirement for originality;67 rather, it compels 
protection for any work of authorship that meets statutory 
requisites, regardless of whether the work is good.68 Although 
early case law struggled with separating these concepts,69 
judicial interpretation of copyright law explicitly limited its 
reach by the early twentieth century.70 Credited for articulating 
the prohibition on judging a work’s merit, Justice Holmes wrote:  
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only 
to the law to constitute themselves judges of the worth of 
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most 
obvious limits. At one extreme, some works of genius would 
be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make 
them repulsive until the public had learned the new 
language in which their author spoke. It may be more than 
doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the 
paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when 
seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be 
denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated 
than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of the 
public, they have a commercial value—and the taste of any 
public is not to be treated with contempt. It is an ultimate 
fact for the moment, whatever may be our hopes for a change. 
 
 66. See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 247, 248 (1998) (“The inherent ambiguity of aesthetics is 
considered incompatible with the supposedly objective rules and principles 
that govern judicial opinions.”).  
 67. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original 
works of authorship . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 68. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d 
Cir. 1951) (“No matter how poor artistically the ‘author’s’ addition, it is enough 
if it be his own.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 53 
(1884) (holding that a photograph of Oscar Wilde fulfilled the originality 
requirement for copyright protection because it was “useful, new, harmonious, 
characteristic, and graceful”); see also John B. Fowles, The Utility of a 
Bright-Line Rule in Copyright Law: Freeing Judges from Aesthetic Controversy 
and Conceptual Separability in Leicester v. Warner Bros., 12 UCLA ENT. L. 
REV. 301, 304 (2005) (noting that the Burrow-Giles court essentially 
“performed an aesthetic valuation to determine copyrightability”).  
 70. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 
(1903) (establishing the judicial endorsement of aesthetic objectivity).  
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That these pictures had their worth and their success is 
sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce them without 
regard to the plaintiff’s rights.71 
The Copyright Act of 197672 further enshrined the idea of 
aesthetic objectivity in its clarification of copyrightable 
“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”73 as distinguishable 
from potentially patentable “works of industrial design.”74 The 
House report stressed that the distinction did not imply the 
need for aesthetic considerations, emphasizing a tenet of United 
States copyright law.75  
In addition, domestic copyright law centers around a policy 
debate concerning the balance between private rights and the 
public sphere.76 The flow of learning and information is crucial; 
thus, copyright law strikes a balance that will incentivize 
creators: “The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure 
a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate 
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the 
general public good.” 77 
There is a certain economic pragmatism present within this 
principle. That is, copyright is a form of economic subsidy.78 As 
such, copyright can be altered by the legislature to serve 
purposes other than the protection of innate rights of 
authorship.79 Taken together, the principles of aesthetic 
objectivity and economic subsidization should ensure an 
aesthetically-neutral approach to copyright decisions that flow 
 
 71. Id. at 251–52. 
 72. Pub L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2441 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–810).  
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). 
 74. H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976). 
 75. Id. at 54 (“[t]he definition of ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ 
carries with it no implied criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic 
quality.”). 
 76. See Fowles, supra note 69, at 305 (identifying relevant competing 
interests).  
 77. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), 
superseded by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 110(5). 
 78. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251–52 (1903) (“[W]hen courts interpret the 
contours of copyrightable subject matter, the single out certain works for 
special economic subsidy.”). 
 79. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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from considerations of economic fairness and utility.80 This Note 
adheres to these principles in its subsequent proposals. 
B.  Architecture and Copyright 
As previously mentioned, United States copyright law 
differs in important respects from other regimes around the 
world.81 This Note focuses on the ramifications of addressing one 
of these inconsistencies: the legislative implementation of 
copyright protection for architectural works, which were 
previously unprotected.82 The legal paradigm by which 
Congress first addressed this specific incongruity was the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(the “Berne Convention” or the “Convention”).83 After waiting 
over one hundred years to ratify the treaty,84 the United States 
acceded to the Convention in 1988, amending the existing 
Copyright Act to afford greater protection to architectural works 
in compliance with the Convention.85 The Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 198886 added “diagrams, models and 
technical drawings, including architectural plans” to its 
compilation of copyrightable material.87 However, this language 
 
 80. See supra notes 66–78 and accompanying text.  
 81. See supra Part II.A. 
 82. See Vanessa N. Scaglione, Building Upon the Architectural Works 
Protection Copyright Act of 1990, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 193, 194 (1992) (“Prior 
to the Architectural Copyright Act, American copyright law did not protect 
architecture per se, although monumental architecture and certain works 
related to architecture were protected.”). For example, consider an arguably 
sculptural work such as the Washington Monument. Id. at 202. Historically, 
this characterization would entitle the work to copyright protection. Id. at 194. 
 83. Art. 2(1), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris Text 1971) (as 
amended Oct. 2, 1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention] (including as protected 
subject matter “works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture . . . .”). 
 84. See Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late Than Never: Implementation of the 
1886 Berne Convention, 22 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 171, 172 (1989) (“Despite the 
evident benefits of Berne membership, the United States waited more than 
102 years to ratify the treaty.”). 
 85. See Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
101-650, 701, 703 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 102 (a)(8), 120)) [hereinafter 
AWCPA] (extending copyright protection to architectural works). 
 86. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified in scattered sections of 
17 U.S.C.).  
 87. Id. 
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merely codified an existing right, which courts enforced prior to 
the Act’s implementation.88 In that regard, proponents of the 
Convention considered the amendment insufficient, because 
there was still no legal prohibition on copying architecture, as 
long as the copying occurred without use of another’s plan.89 
Others wished to see as little change as possible in domestic 
copyright law and considered independent copyright protection 
for built works a radical departure from current law.90 
Ultimately, the treaty altered the way the United States 
managed issues of copyright protection for architectural 
works.91  
1.  The Outer Limit of Copyright: Functionality 
Before copyright law considered architecture a protected 
form of authorship, built architectural works were excluded 
because of their inherent functionality.92 The lack of specific 
protection for architectural works compelled the interpretation 
of provisions addressing sculpture, its closest relative.93 
Sculpture found itself limited by this prohibition on 
functionality: 
 
 88. See Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 
1972) (“If copyrighted architectural drawings of the originator of such plans 
are imitated or transcribed in whole or in part, infringement occurs.”); Aitken, 
Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 262–63 
(D. Neb. 1982) (awarding damages to plaintiff for unauthorized use of 
construction plans); Arthur Rutenberg Corp. v. Dawney, 647 F. Supp. 1214, 
1215–16 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (same). 
 89. The Convention imagined protection for three-dimensional works of 
architecture, not solely monumental works. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., ANNUAL 
REP. OF THE REG. OF COPYRIGHTS 5–6 (1989) (discussing adherence to the Berne 
Convention).  
 90. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 9 (1988) (“The U.S. should and can 
adhere to Berne without making major changes in U.S. law”.). 
 91. See Fowles, supra note 69, at 320 n.145 (describing the attenuated 
protection received by architectural works from certain provisions of copyright 
law). 
 92. See id. at 328 (describing functionality as “any aspect that made the 
structure a ‘useful article,’ such as e.g. inhabitability”). This broad 
interpretation automatically excluded most architecture from copyright 
protection. Id. 
 93. See Scaglione, supra note 82, at 194 (explaining architecture’s 
derivative protection).  
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[PGS works] shall include works of artistic craftsmanship 
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian 
aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as 
defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent 
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural features that can be identified separately from, 
and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.94 
By the same logic, “[p]urely nonfunctional or monumental 
[architectural] structures would be subject to full copyright 
protection under the [1976 Act] and the same would be true of 
artistic sculpture or decorative ornamentation or 
embellishment added to a structure.”95 As such, nonfunctional 
works of architecture, such as the Washington Monument, were 
theoretically copyrightable as sculpture.96 Alternatively, 
elements of functional architectural structures could also be 
eligible for copyright, only if they were “conceptually separable” 
from the functional elements of the structure.97 For example, 
separable ornamentation such as a gargoyle affixed to a Gothic 
cathedral would be protected, but not the building itself.98 
Outside of these exceptions, copyright protection for 
architecture existed only for written plans.99 In practice, this 
protection was limited.100 Therefore, true adherence to the 
 
 94. 17 U.S.C. § 101. A “useful article” is “an article having an intrinsic 
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article 
or to convey information.” Id. 
 95. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976). 
 96. See Laura E. Steinfeld, Note, The Berne Convention and Protection of 
Works of Architecture: Why the United States Should Create a New Subject 
Matter Category for Works of Architecture under Section 120(a) of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 24 IND. L. REV. 459, 473 (1991) (citing Jones Bros. Co. v. 
Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936)) (discussing one of the two ways 
architecture availed itself of copyright protection before accession to the Berne 
Convention). 
 97. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55. For more on this concept, see infra Part 
II.B.2. 
 98. Steinfeld, supra note 96, at 473. 
 99. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880) (providing that copyright 
protects only an author’s expression and not the useful idea being expressed), 
superseded by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. 
Supp. 658, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[C]onsistent with Baker . . . although an 
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treaty would have the effect of solidifying a makeshift legal 
solution with bespoke protection for built architectural works, 
regardless of functionality.101  
2.  The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act 
(AWCPA)102 
However, in order to respect the dividing line between 
functional and nonfunctional, courts developed a series of 
tests—separability tests—to distinguish functional aspects of 
eligible works of authorship.103 The elements that passed the 
test received copyright protection.104 John Fowles argues that 
Congress’s interpretation of its constitutional mandate “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries”105 has “put courts 
‘adrift on the murky sea of common law’ regarding aesthetically 
pleasing, but useful, articles.”106 According to the House report: 
Although the shape of an industrial product may be 
aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee’s 
intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill. 
Unless the shape of an . . . industrial product contains some 
elements that, physically or conceptually, can be identified 
as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the 
design would not be copyrighted under the bill. The test of 
separability and independence from “the utilitarian aspects 
of the article” does not depend upon the nature of its 
design — that is, even if the appearance of an article is 
determined by esthetic (as opposed to functional) 
 
owner of copyrighted architectural plans is granted the right to prevent the 
unauthorized copying of those plans, that individual, without benefit of a 
design patent, does not obtain a protectable interest in the useful article 
depicted by those plans.”). 
 101. See infra Part II.B.2.  
 102. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 701, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (1990) (codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 102 (a)(8), (120)). 
 103. See Fowles, supra note 69, at 310 (describing the origin of these tests).   
 104. See id. at 328 (providing that “artistic sculpture or decorative 
ornamentation or embellishment . . . would have to survive the conceptual 
separability tests spawned by the 1976 Act’s ‘identified separately’ language”). 
 105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 106. Fowles, supra note 69, at 308 (quoting Columbia Hyundai, Inc. v. 
Carll Hyundai, Inc., 484 S.E.2d 468, 470 (S.C. 1997)). 
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considerations, only elements, if any, which can be identified 
separately from the useful article as such are 
copyrightable.107 
In some courts, the congressional explanation of the test 
prompted the development of a straightforward test centered 
around physical separability.108 Other courts formed tests 
contingent upon conceptual separability.109 Fowles counts at 
least ten different separability tests in total.110 
Ultimately, Congress selected adherence to the Convention 
and implemented a specific provision that codified architectural 
works as a protected category of authorship.111  
In 1990, Congress passed the AWCPA, amending the 
current United States Copyright Act.112 The amendment 
provided distinct copyright protection for a category of creative 
expression that had previously existed outside the scope of 
copyright law.113 The effect of the law on contemporary 
interpretation of copyright protection became clear a decade 
later, in a Ninth Circuit case tackling the issue of whether 
conceptual separability survived the enactment of the 
AWCPA.114  
III.  Judicial Interpretation of Copyright for 
Architecturally-Situated PGS Works  
In Leicester v. Warner Brothers,115 the Ninth Circuit 
considered copyright protection for a sculptural work 
commissioned as part of a greater architectural project when 
sculptor Andrew Leicester sued Warner Brothers for its 
unauthorized use of his work created in conjunction with the 
 
 107. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976). 
 108. Fowles, supra note 69, at 310. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 322. 
 111. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (listing architecture as an enumerated form 
of protected authorship).  
 112. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2441 (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C §§ 101-810). 
 113. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 114. See infra Part III.  
 115. 232 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000).  
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construction of the 801 Tower in downtown Los Angeles.116 To 
fulfill a condition mandated by the Los Angeles Community 
Redevelopment Agency (CRA),117 R&T, the development 
company, hired Leicester to design a courtyard space on the 
south side of the 801 Tower, which Warner Brothers used in one 
of its films, Batman Forever.118 
The courtyard tells an allegorical story of the history of Los 
Angeles through its component parts, the centerpiece of which 
is a courtyard with a sculptural fountain, benches, and various 
towers also adorned with sculpture.119 Leicester also designed a 
group of five towers to form a wall, punctuated by the entrance 
to the courtyard and building.120 Two of these towers are capped 
with brass metal work in the form of smoke.121 Two additional 
towers support lanterns crested with grill work.122 The final of 
the five streetwall towers is topped with a vampire figure.123 
When the gates close, the figure represents a vampire bat meant 
to evoke William Mulholland’s description of Los Angeles as a 
“water vampire.”124 
In 1994, Warner Brothers selected the 801 Tower and four 
of Leicester’s five towers—the smoke towers and the lantern 
towers that form the building’s southern streetwall––to 
represent the Second Bank of Gotham in Batman Forever.125 
The vampire tower and courtyard proper do not appear in the 
film, but Warner Brothers obtained the rights from R&T 
development to create a miniature model for special effects 
 
 116. See id. at 1214 (discussing the conceptualization of the project).  
 117. See id. (describing the CRA instructions to Leicester and the 801 
Tower’s architect, John Hayes). 
 118. Id. at 1215 
 119. Id. at 1214. In center of the courtyard stands a fountain through 
which water flows to a channel representing the Zanja Madre, translating to 
“Mother Ditch,” which brought water into the city in its early establishment. 
Id. The garden, fountain, and benches symbolize the mountains surrounding 
Los Angeles, which provide the city water. Id. 
 120. See id. (considering the “streetwall” portion of the artwork).  
 121. See id. (referring to these towers the “smoke towers”). 
 122. See id. (naming these towers the “lantern towers”). 
 123. See id. (describing how the gates form the vampire’s “wings”). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 1215 (clarifying that Leicester and the architect were not 
consulted; Warner Bros received permission directly from R&T).  
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purposes.126 Leicester claimed that Warner Brothers’ use of his 
work infringed upon his copyright.127 In opposition, Warner 
Brothers contended that any use of Leicester’s sculpture fell 
within the § 120(a) exemption for pictorial representations of 
architectural works.128 The court decided that the pictorial 
representation of the miniature model fell summarily in Warner 
Brothers’ favor while the use of the remaining four towers was 
vigorously contested in both the district court and on appeal.129  
The district court found that the four towers “have 
functional aspects designed to be part of the building plan and 
from their appearance are designed to match up with the 
architecture of the building.”130 In addition, “the artistic work at 
the tops are incorporated into the tower structure and design, 
and are therefore an integrated part of the architectural 
work.”131 The Ninth Circuit did not disturb these findings on 
appeal, but did examine the legislative history of the AWCPA to 
address Leicester’s contention that “the towers are conceptually 
separate from the building and are protectable as a sculptural 
work after the 1990 Act as they were before.”132 The Ninth 
Circuit considered the district court’s analysis of the 1990 
amendments, which codified the AWCPA: 
 
 126. Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2000).  
 127. See id. (listing Leicester’s additional claims).  
 128. Id.  
 129. See id. at 1220 (“[T]he district court correctly construed the contract 
as conferring on R&T an exclusive right to make three-dimensional 
representations of the Zanja Madre of all sizes; therefore, R&T could 
sublicense that right to Warner Brothers.”); see also id. at 1213–14 (“Leicester 
argues that the court erred by refusing to consider [his work] as a unitary 
sculptural work, and by construing the 1990 Act so as to eliminate separate 
protection for sculptural works attached to buildings.”).   
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. The district court also included a detailed inquiry concerning the 
legislative history of the AWCPA. See Leicester v. Warner Bros., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1501, 1508 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d, 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000) (reaching the 
conclusion that Congress, when amending § 120(a) of the Copyright Act, 
intended to “substitute the new protection afforded architectural works for the 
previous protection sometimes provided under the conceptual separability test 
for non-utilitarian sculptures . . . incorporated into a work of architecture”); 
see also Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 933–34 (C.D. Cal. 
2018) (summarizing the Ninth Circuit’s use of legislative history in Leicester). 
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[The district court] declined to construe the 1990 
amendments as Leicester urged, to leave intact the 
previously authorized protection for sculptural works that 
were “conceptually separable” from the building of which 
they are a part, concluding instead that the intent of 
Congress was to substitute the new protection afforded 
architectural works for the previous protection sometimes 
provided under the conceptual separability test for 
non-utilitarian sculptures (such as gargoyles and stained 
glass windows) incorporated into a work of architecture.133 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit avoided making a direct 
ruling on this interpretation. Instead, it relied upon the district 
court’s determination on Leicester’s conceptual separability 
argument, writing, “the district court found otherwise and we 
cannot say its finding lacks support.”134 However, the Ninth 
Circuit found the district court reasoning compelling: 
When copyright owners in architectural works were given 
protection for the first time in 1990, the right was limited by 
§ 120(a) so that publicly visible buildings could be freely 
photographed. This reflected a shift from the prior regime of 
relying on “ad hoc determinations” of fair use. Having done 
this, it would be counterintuitive to suppose that Congress 
meant to restrict pictorial copying to some, but not all of, a 
unitary architectural work.135  
Evidently, the concept of conceptual separability for 
architectural works is disapproved of but not foreclosed by the 
Ninth Circuit, but the finding that the sculptural work is (1) 
functional and (2) integrated subjects it to the pictorial 
representation limitation of the AWCPA.136 Thus, Leicester 
suggests that the designation of a PGS work as either part of or 
separate from its architectural surroundings is crucial to an 
artist’s infringement claim.137  
 
 133. Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1215. 
 134. Id. at 1219. 
 135. Id. at 1219–20. 
 136. See Fowles, supra note 69, at 336 (summarizing the district court’s 
holding, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit). 
 137. Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(applying the § 120(a) exemption “[b]ecause the streetwall towers are part of 
the architectural work” (emphasis added)). 
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By affirming the district court’s “integrated concept” test,138 
the Leicester court placed the integration determination at the 
beginning of the inquiry.139 The court then declined to explore 
the applicability of the conceptual separability doctrine,140 
which had previously been used to distinguish non-functional 
aspects from works of architecture that were otherwise 
ineligible for copyright protection before the implementation of 
the AWCPA.141 
Scholars are divided on the outcome of Leicester and its 
resulting curtailment of copyright for PGS authors who create 
works affixed to architecture.142 Fowles argues that Leicester 
indicates the utility of a bright line rule in determining whether 
a PGS work physically connected to an architectural structure 
retains independent copyright protection, while Jay Orlandi 
contends that “an abridgment, modification, or omission of any 
or all of the copyright rights initially conferred upon [a PGS 
work]” should not be revoked absent statutory basis.143 Notably, 
Leicester’s applicability to all PGS works is still unclear to 
 
 138. Id. at 1217. 
 139. See id. at 1219 (suggesting that the inquiry occurs separately from 
any possibly available separability test). 
 140. See id. at 1221 (quoting Leicester, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1508) (“[T]he 
district court found it unnecessary to decide whether the streetwall towers 
were conceptually separable because it concluded as a matter of law that ‘the 
enactment of Section 120(a) had the effect of limiting the conceptual 
separability concept to situations not involving architectural works.’”). 
 141. See Fowles, supra note 69, at 308 (describing the “quagmire of 
conceptual separability” (quoting Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1223 (Tashima, J., 
concurring))). 
 142. Compare id. (applauding the Ninth Circuit’s avoidance of the 
conceptual separability doctrine), with Jay Orlandi, Gargoyles in Gotham: A 
Sculpture Incorporated into an Architectural Work Should Retain Independent 
Copyright Protection, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 617, 644–52 (2000) (proposing a 
multipart test to prevent the misapplication of limited copyright protection to 
works that should otherwise enjoy full PSG protection). 
 143. See Fowles, supra note 69, at 303 (“[T]he Leicester court’s strict 
construction of the AWCPA’s bright-line rule has saved judges from aesthetic 
controversy and conceptual separability in cases regarding the copyright of 
PSG works attached to architectural works.”); Orlandi, supra note 142, at 617 
(arguing that there is no statutory basis for the district court’s decision in 
Leicester). 
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courts.144 Considered by both the Falkner and Lewis courts with 
respect to painted murals, Leicester has yet to provide a succinct 
answer for all PGS works, some of which are demonstrably 
incompatible with Leicester’s reasoning.145 The following section 
explores this incongruity in depth.  
IV.  Certain Architecturally-Situated PGS Works Should Not 
Be Subject to the Pictorial Representation Exemption of the 
AWCPA 
PGS works, grouped within an enumerated category in the 
Copyright Act, are eligible for certain protection from 
reproduction.146 The category encompasses a broad range of 
works.147 Unifying this group of copyrightable subject matter is 
a lack of “utilitarian aspects.”148 Historically, this protection has 
been preserved even when PGS works were affixed to a 
functional article.149 Until Leicester, fair use served as the 
 
 144. See Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 934 (C.D. Cal. 
2018) (noting that Leicester did not provide “a single, determinative test”). But 
see Mercedes Benz, USA v. Lewis, Nos. 19-10948, -10949, -10951, 2019 WL 
4302769, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2019) (“In sum, nothing in Leicester 
supports defendants’ argument that Mercedes does not have a claim under the 
AWCPA.”).  
 145. See infra Part IV.D (discussing Leicester’s applicability to 
non-sculptural works). 
 146. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (including pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works as copyrightable subject matter). 
 147. See id. § 101 
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include two-dimensional 
and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, 
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, 
diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural 
plans. Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship 
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects 
are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this 
section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work 
only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified 
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the article. 
 148. Id.  
 149. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1953) (holding that a PGS work 
with arguably functional aspects can still be eligible for copyright), superseded 
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limiting principle for PGS copyright protection.150 However the 
subsequent interpretations of Leicester signal that protection for 
PGS works affixed to architecture may be in jeopardy not 
because of their functionality but solely due to the author’s 
choice of fixed medium.151 This Part argues that certain PGS 
works should be insulated from § 120(a)’s reach and contends 
that an exception for certain PGS works, such as that identified 
by Falkner, comports with the objectives of the Copyright Act.152 
This Part concludes that Falkner’s nascent reasoning does not 
offer enough clarity to courts: Leicester’s application is still 
unclear, and a new test built upon Falkner’s foundation should 
be proposed.153  
A.  The Effect of the Pictorial Representation Exemption 
When Congress amended the Copyright Act to comply with 
international treaty obligations, it added § 120(a), which allows 
pictorial representations of architectural works “located in or 
ordinarily visible from a public space.”154 Prior to 1990, 
architectural works were excluded from copyright to the extent 
that they were considered useful ideas and not forms of 
expression.155 Although architectural works are currently 
among the enumerated provisions in the Copyright Act, the 
 
by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (“A 
two-dimensional painting, drawing, or graphic work is still capable of being 
identified as such when it is printed on or applied to utilitarian articles such 
as textile fabrics, wallpaper, containers, and the like.”). 
 150. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing factors to be considered in determining 
whether reproduction of copyrighted material is fair use). 
 151. See Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769, at *5 (finding Leicester unsupportive of 
the artists’ position). 
 152. See infra Part IV.C (arguing that a limitation on Leicester’s broad 
applicability complies with the objectives of the copyright act). 
 153. See infra Part IV.D.  
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a). § 120(a) reads in full: 
The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed 
does not include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or 
public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial 
representations of the work, if the building in which the work is 
embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.  
 155. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also Fowles, supra 
note 69, at 320 n.145 (2005) (describing the attenuated protection received by 
architectural works from certain provisions of copyright law). 
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extent to which they are insulated from reproduction varies 
from PGS works.156 Under current copyright law, § 120(a) 
allows pictorial representations of architecture regardless of 
whether those representations are fair use.157 Because of this 
difference, the designation of an architecturally-fixed PGS work 
as either part of or separate from its surroundings is crucial to 
an artist’s infringement claim, because that determination 
affects the applicability of this pictorial representation 
exemption.158 If § 120(a) applies, there is no method for an artist 
to protect the work from pictorial reproduction.159 The effect of 
this provision is clear from Falkner and Lewis, where the rights 
of multiple artists who had their works indisputably reproduced 
and used for commercial purposes without their permission 
faced an uphill battle in court.160  
B.  Leicester’s Interpretation and Falkner’s Limitation 
Unfortunately for artists like Falkner and Lewis, Leicester’s 
interpretation of the § 120(a) provision encourages its broad 
application to PGS works.161 Leicester holds that PGS works 
which are “part of” an architectural structure do not retain 
 
 156. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(a)(8) (adding architectural works as an 
enumerated form of authorship). But see id. § 120(a) (providing an exemption 
for certain reproductions of architectural works).  
 157. See id. § 120(a) (allowing pictorial representations absent fair use 
analysis).  
 158. Compare Leicester v. Warner Bros, 232 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 
2000) (applying the § 120(a) exemption “[b]ecause the streetwall towers are 
part of the architectural work (emphasis added)), with Falkner v. Gen. Motors 
LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 937 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (declining to apply the § 120(a) 
pictorial representation exemption without first concluding that the mural 
was part of the architectural work). 
 159. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a). 
 160. See generally Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927; Mercedes Benz, USA v. 
Lewis, Nos. 19-10948, -10949, -10951, 2019 WL 4302769 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 
2019) (considering limited protection for PGS works that would otherwise be 
covered by copyright). 
 161. See Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1220 (“[I]t would be counterintuitive to 
suppose that Congress meant to restrict pictorial copying to some, but not all 
of, a unitary architectural work.”) Although Leicester’s holding is not explicitly 
this broad, the majority’s reading of congressional intent favors the 
application of § 120(a) to all PGS works. Id. 
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independent copyright protection.162 The court did not explicitly 
design a test for making this designation, but “part of” carries 
with it an implication that the work is both integrated and 
functional.163 An integrated work “includes both architectural 
and artistic portions” that, as a whole, create “the artistic and 
architectural impression.”164 A finding that portions of the 
integrated concept serve an “architectural and urban design 
purpose” supports their designation as “functional.”165 
Moreover, functionality of component parts may imbue 
functionality within the entire work.166 The propriety of this 
conclusion is arguable based on the circumstances of Leicester, 
as the boundary between sculpture and architecture is easily 
obfuscated.167 Yet there are other works within the greater PGS 
category that are comparatively distinguishable, painted 
murals among them.168  
 
 162. See id. at 1219 (“Because the streetwall towers are part of the 
architectural work, § 120(a) applies.”). 
 163. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
 164. Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1217. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1218 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101) (“‘[A]rchitectural work’ extends 
to the ‘overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and 
elements in the design’ [of the building].”). 
 167. See id. at 1222 n.2 (Tashima, J., concurring) (“Here, the disputed PGS 
work is the functional equivalent of a building wall, serving the architectural 
purpose of extending the building line itself . . . .”); see also BRUNO ZEVI, 
ARCHITECTURE AS SPACE: HOW TO LOOK AT ARCHITECTURE 76 (Milton Gendel, 
trans., Horizon Press 1957) 
Anyone seeking primarily a conception of architectural space might 
well point to the Greek temple as a horrible example of 
non-architecture. Yet, whoever views the Parthenon as a giant 
piece of sculpture must be impressed by it as by the few works of 
human genius. Every architect, we have seen, must also be 
something of a sculptor in order to extend his spatial theme to the 
plastic and decorative treatment of the structure, but the persistent 
myth that it was Phidias, the sculptor, rather than architects 
Ictinus and Callicrates, who conceived the Parthenon, is a perfect 
symbol for the purely sculptural character (and impression) of 
Greek religious architecture through its seven centuries of 
development.  
 168. See for example Judge Fisher’s dissent recognizing the “uncertainty” 
and “[o]ther difficulties” presented by a blanket application of § 120(a) to all 
PGS works: 
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Falkner began to articulate the limits of Leicester in its 
exploration of § 120(a)’s application to a painted mural.169 
Following an in-depth analysis of Leicester, Falkner offered its 
own interpretation of the opinion: “[I]n order for a PGS work to 
be treated as an architectural work (and subject to the § 120(a) 
exemption that limits the protection of architectural works), the 
PGS work must either be an independent architectural work of 
be ‘part of’ an architectural work.”170 Distilling factors and their 
relevant indicia, the Falkner court settled on an inquiry: 
Although the court in Leicester did not define a single, 
determinative test for what renders a PGS work “part of” an 
architectural work, it did describe factors. It considered 
whether the PGS work had a concept that integrated it into 
the underlying architectural work or whether the PGS work 
could itself be considered an architectural feature. It also 
commented that PGS works may be part of an architectural 
work when they are designed to appear as part of the 
building or when they serve a functional purpose that is 
related to the building.171 
Using this interpretation, the court held that the facts in 
Leicester were “entirely distinguishable” from Falkner’s 
 
Ultimately, the only way to maneuver cleanly around these 
admitted difficult problems is to read (as the concurrence suggests) 
the AWCPA so broadly as to eliminate fully the rights of any PGS 
work that is even a modest part of an architectural work, with no 
attention given to the size of the work, placement, impact on the 
building, degree of functionality or possible conceptual separability. 
I believe this goes too far. It would discourage an artist from 
painting even a small work on the building. A sculptor would 
rightfully be wary of placing a piece too close to a building, or on a 
pedestal made with the same themes or patterns as the 
architectural work.   
Leicester v. Warner Bros, 232 F.3d 1212, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) (Fisher, J., 
dissenting). 
  For a proposed distinction between sculpture and architecture, see 
also ZEVI, supra note 167, at 28 (“Beautiful architecture would then be 
architecture in which the internal space attracts us, elevates us and dominates 
us spiritually . . . no work lacking internal space can be considered 
architecture.”). 
 169. Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 931 (C.D. Cal. 
2018). 
 170. Id. at 934 (quoting Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1217 (majority opinion)). 
 171. Id. at 937. 
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claim.172 Noting a “lack of a relevant connection between the 
mural and the parking garage,” the court could not hold as a 
matter of law whether § 120(a) applied.173 
In sum, although Leicester provides a compelling analysis 
as to why a certain sculpture should not retain copyright 
protection beyond that afforded to architectural works under 
the Copyright Act, this conclusion should not reach all PGS 
works.174 Falkner represents the conceptual struggle in 
attempting to apply the holding of Leicester to a PGS work that 
is clearly not part of the architectural structure to which it is 
physically connected.175 By distinguishing the PGS work at 
issue from the sculptural courtyard considered in Leicester, the 
Falkner court flags a potential exception that could prevent total 
loss of independent copyright protection for a subclass of PGS 
works, even with its narrow procedural holding.176 The following 
section explores this exception’s compatibility with the 
Copyright Act.  
C.  A Limitation on Leicester Accords with the Copyright Act 
A significant portion of the Leicester analysis concerns the 
tension between established copyright protection for PGS works 
and the 1990 amendments to the Copyright Act, which added 
the pictorial representation exemption for works of 
architecture.177 The majority indicates the obvious frustration 
that would occur in attempting to sever a PGS work from its 
architectural backdrop, as Congress added the exemption for 
pictorial representation of architecture to ensure that these 
works could be freely photographed without the possibility of 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Orlandi, supra note 142, at 619 (arguing that Leicester should not 
jeopardize copyright protection for all PGS works).  
 175. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (remarking that the facts of the 
case are entirely distinguishable from Leicester). The court notices that there 
is in fact “a lack of a relevant connection between the mural and the parking 
garage.” Id. 
 176. See id. (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment because 
the mural could not be declared part of the architectural structure as a matter 
of law). 
 177. See Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1217 (discussing congressional reasoning 
regarding the pictorial representation exemption).  
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infringing.178 This issue was also addressed by the 
concurrence179 as well as the dissent.180  
This confusion can be attributed to the inherent 
functionality of Leicester’s courtyard.181 In fact, Judge Tashima 
expressed a preference for a narrow holding.182 The observations 
made by the Leicester court are compelling, but—as Falkner 
recognized—do not foreclose separate copyright protection for 
every PGS work affixed to architecture.183 This conclusion, 
rather than the alternative complete loss of copyright protection 
for PGS works, adheres to the purpose of the Copyright Act.184  
 
 178. See id. 
Otherwise, § 120(a)’s exemption for pictorial representations of 
buildings would make no sense. When copyright owners in 
architectural works were given protection for the first time in 1990, 
the right was limited by § 120(a) so that publicly visible buildings 
could freely be photographed.  
 179. See Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1222 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(Tashima, J., concurring)  
There is ample support in the legislative history of the Act that the 
protection for architectural works in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) is now 
the exclusive remedy for PGS works embodied in an architectural 
work—at least for those PGS works that are so functionally a part 
of a building that § 120(a)’ s exemption would be rendered 
meaningless for such buildings, if conceptual separability were 
applied to them. 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 6952 (1990)). 
 180. See id. at 1229 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress enacted 
the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act concurrently with the 
Visual Artists Rights Act). Judge Fisher remarked: “It would be odd to 
interpret the AWCPA as eliminating protection for certain works of PGS 
artists when, contemporaneously with the AWCPA, Congress enhanced the 
rights of PGS artists through [that] separate legislation.” Id.  
 181. See id. at 1219–20 (majority opinion) (repeatedly emphasizing the 
courtyard’s functional aspects).  
 182. See id. at 1222 (Tashima, J., concurring). 
In these factual circumstances, where a joint architectural/ artistic 
work functions as part of a building, the district court concluded 
that § 120(a)’s exemption applied to protect Warner Bros. pictorial 
representation of the streetwall towers against a claim of copyright 
infringement. I agree with that conclusion in the narrow 
circumstances of this case.  
 183. See Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 937 (C.D. Cal. 
2018) (noting distinguishing facts from those of Leicester).  
 184. See generally Orlandi, supra note 142 (arguing for a test that 
preserves copyright for some PGS works).  
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The Copyright Act explicitly protects PGS works of 
authorship.185 Historically, this protection has been preserved 
even when PGS works were affixed to a functional article.186 The 
resulting doctrine of conceptual separability—the continued 
applicability of which the Leicester majority did not 
address187 — demonstrates the degree to which the law 
accommodated copyright protection for PGS works intertwined 
with functional objects.188 In sum, copyright law has dealt with 
severing PGS works from functional objects before.189 A clear 
test that performs this inquiry with architecture and a 
non-functional object, such as a painted mural, is more 
compatible with the object of copyright protection than the 
removal of a historically protected category that has little to do 
with the functional aspects of its architectural background.190   
Moreover, a limitation on Leicester does not frustrate the 
purpose of § 120(a). With the enactment of the AWCPA, 
Congress provided underlying reasons for the inclusion of the 
pictorial representation exemption.191 The reasons identified 
concern tourism and academia, undergirded by the assumption 
that the public purpose served outweighs the potential harm to 
the author.192 The House report states: 
Architecture is a public art form and is enjoyed as such. 
Millions of people visit our cities every year and take back 
home photographs, posters, and other pictorial 
representations of prominent works of architecture as a 
memory of their trip. Additionally, numerous scholarly books 
 
 185. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).  
 186. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  
 187. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 936 (“In sum, an important question 
appears to remain open, at least partially, after Leicester: whether conceptual 
separability applies in the context of architectural works.”).  
 188. See Fowles, supra note 69, at 308–22 (providing an overview of the 
various separability tests in copyright law).  
 189. Id. 
 190. See Orlandi, supra note 142 at 644 (“Given the underlying purpose of 
copyright law, and the small likelihood that the public will be harmed by 
allowing artists to retain independent copyrights in incorporated works of art, 
creation of a test is necessary to protect artists on the verge of incorporating 
their works into larger architectural schemes.”). 
 191. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 12 (1990) (discussing the enactment of 
the AWCPA).  
 192. Id. 
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on architecture are based on the ability to use photographs 
of architectural works. These uses do not interfere with the 
normal exploitation of architectural works. Given the 
important public purpose served by these uses and the lack 
of harm to the copyright owner’s market, the Committee 
chose to provide an exemption, rather than rely on the 
doctrine of fair use, which requires ad hoc determinations.193  
In response to the tourism concern, museums that display 
protected art have no issue relying upon fair use.194 In addition, 
the same issues are faced in digitizing museum collections for 
scholarly books and classroom use, both of which are based upon 
the ability to use photographs of potentially protected 
artwork.195 Moreover, the “lack of harm” is relative.196 This 
statement concerns a creative category that previously lay 
outside the purview of copyright.197 In other words, limited 
copyright protection is preferable to no copyright protection, 
hence the relatively low level of harm. The same cannot be said 
for the removal of copyright protection from a category of 
authorship that has historically enjoyed inclusion, with no other 
limitation outside of fair use, within the copyright sphere.198  
However, adhering to the congressional preference to avoid 
fair use inquiries, an exception from the pictorial representation 
exemption should be created for painted murals to ensure their 
protection from commercial exploitation, but also to preserve 
the right of the public to freely take photographs of the 
architectural structure.199 This exception should strike a 
 
 193. Id.   
 194. See Jennifer Saranow Schultz, When It’s Illegal to Photograph 
Artwork, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2010, 5:13 PM), https://perma.cc/8SL2-SSGG 
(discussing personal reproductions of copyright-protected art in museums). 
 195. See Ann C. Shincovich, Copyright Issues and the Creation of a Digital 
Resource: Artists’ Books Collection at the Frick Fine Arts Library, 23 J. ART 
LIBRS. SOC’Y N. AM. 8, 8 (2004) (examining the issues of copyright law for the 
creation of a digital resource from art books).  
 196. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.  
 197. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (1994) (codifying a portion of the AWCPA). 
 198. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 199. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 12 (noting that § 120(a) advantageously 
“provide[s] an exemption, rather than rely on the doctrine of fair use, which 
requires ad hoc determinations”). 
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balance between the language of the AWCPA, while fulfilling 
the principles of copyright law.200 
D.  Falkner Appropriately Limits Leicester, but Its Holding Is 
Insufficient  
The classification “part of” carries with it total loss of 
copyright status—a harsh consequence considering that 
notwithstanding its fixture, the work is independently eligible 
for protection.201 An austere application of Leicester could lead a 
court to conclude that there is some legally discernible 
difference between a work painted directly onto the exterior of 
a building and a work first executed on canvas prior to display 
on the same exterior structure.202 This superficial distinction is 
exactly where the putative infringers in Falkner and Lewis ask 
the court to draw a line.203 However, unlike the sculptural 
courtyard in Leicester, painted works do not lend themselves to 
the “part of” inquiry.204 Applied to painted works, the factors 
that weigh in favor of integration—such as physical 
attachment—do not represent any meaningful distinction that 
justifies total loss of copyright protection.205 In fact, the analysis 
 
 200. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) 
(“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 
‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate 
artistic creativity for the general public good.”). 
 201. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting exclusive reproduction rights to the 
owner of copyright). But see id. § 120(a) (limiting exclusive rights to pictorial 
representations of architectural works).  
 202. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Defendant General Motors LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment at 7, Falkner v. Gen. Motors 
LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2018) (No. 18-cv-00549) (arguing 
that Falkner’s infringement claim fails as a matter of law because the 
allegedly infringed mural is incorporated into a building); Plaintiff Mercedes 
Benz USA LLC’s Opposition to Defendant Daniel Bombardier’s Motion to 
Dismiss, Mercedes Benz, USA v. Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769 (No. 19-cv-10951) 
(arguing that the AWCPA protects Mercedes’s photograph).   
 204. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (concisely noting that the factors 
relevant in Leicester do not apply to the facts at hand).   
 205. The idea of concurrence is implied in the Falkner analysis; whether 
the PGS work was painted contemporaneously with construction would weigh 
in favor of there being an “integrated concept.” See id. (considering “whether 
the PGS work had a concept which integrated into the underlying 
architectural work”). 
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appears to be an easily resolved issue absent the extraordinary 
characterization of the painting as an architectural work 
itself.206 Although Falkner’s conclusion is correct, its analysis 
shows that the test could be more clear, perhaps completely 
distinct from the Leicester analysis.207 Moreover, the Lewis 
court’s interpretation demonstrates that courts will not always 
interpret Leicester correctly.208 This possibility should be 
curtailed. 
In its examination of Leicester, the Falkner court identified 
a list of factors to be considered in determining whether a PGS 
work is part of an architectural structure.209 These factors 
include (1) “whether the PGS work had a concept that 
integrated it into the underlying architectural work,” (2) 
“whether the PGS work could itself be considered an 
architectural feature,” (3) whether the PGS work is “designed to 
appear as part of the building,” or (4) whether the PGS “serve[s] 
a functional purpose.”210 Although the court did not explicitly 
state how these factors are meant to weigh in relation to one 
another, it is unlikely that any one of these factors is dispositive 
in the analysis.211 Considering these factors in turn—from least 
applicable to arguably applicable—it is clear that the Leicester 
analysis yields no meaningful argument for excluding a painted 
mural from its original protection under the Copyright Act.  
Considering whether the mural is part of the architecture 
work, the Falkner court did not thoroughly analyze whether a 
painted mural could be classified as an architectural feature.212 
However, applying the Leicester reasoning to the PGS work at 
issue in Falkner, it is clear that this factor will almost always 
weigh against classifying a PGS work as integrated.  
 
 206. See id. (“Defendant is not arguing that the mural itself is an 
architectural feature.”). 
 207. See infra Part V.  
 208. See infra Part IV.D.2.  
 209. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (deriving a list of relevant factors 
from Leicester). 
 210. Id.  
 211. See id. (stating that “[v]ery few if any of these factors appear to be 
present in the instant case”). This statement suggests the presence of only 
some factors is insufficient. Id. 
 212. See id. at 937 (noting only that “defendant is not arguing that the 
mural is itself an architectural feature”). 
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In Leicester, the court categorized the sculptural courtyard 
as an architectural feature.213 Setting aside the esoteric 
discussion that could occur in considering this factor,214 the 
court instead looked to legislative language and intent.215 It 
affirmed the district court’s reliance on the language of § 101 of 
the Copyright Act, which provides: “[architectural] work 
includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and 
composition of spaces and elements in the design . . . .”216 The 
court also considered testimony from an expert, who stated that 
streetwalls traditionally constitute an architectural feature: 
“Particularly in modern urban design, streetwalls are one of the 
basics of architectural vocabulary, along with columns, windows 
and doors.”217 The Falkner court repeated this definition but did 
not apply it in its analysis of the mural, implying its irrelevance 
to the PGS work at issue.218   
In addition, Falkner identified an integrated concept factor, 
examined through the inclusion of “both architectural and 
artistic portions.”219 The court followed Leicester’s reasoning, 
which examined the artistic and architectural qualities of the 
PGS work for an integrated concept.220 The artistic qualities 
considered in Leicester concerned building material.221 The 
 
 213. See Leicester v. Warner Bros, 232 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“The streetwall [formed by the four towers] was not a creative aspect of 
Leicester’s work; it was an architectural element mandated by the CRA, which 
required a structure with sufficient mass to establish the street edge . . . .”).  
 214. See ZEVI, supra note 168 (arguing interior space is an essential 
element of architecture); Fowles, supra note 69, at 328–29 (discussing 
functionality as the division between architecture and sculpture). 
 215. See Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1219; see also Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 
393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 936 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (considering the Leicester majority’s 
analysis of legislative history and intent).  
 216. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 217. Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1218. 
 218. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 934 (“[The Leicester court] noted, 
relatedly, that certain PGS works may independently be ‘traditionally 
considered as architectural features’ or ‘one of the basics of the architectural 
vocabulary,’ such as columns, windows, and doors.” (quoting Leicester, 232 
F.3d at 1218)). 
 219. Id. (quoting Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1217).   
 220. See id. (citing Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1218) (identifying similarities 
between the PGS work and architectural structure). 
 221. See Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1218 (noting that the bases of the streetwall 
towers were constructed with the same marble).  
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architectural qualities identified in Leicester involve design 
iteration, parallel scale, and positioning.222  
A painted mural does not fit within this analysis, as it lacks 
the architectural and artistic qualities imagined by the Leicester 
court.223 An integrated concept analysis requires consideration 
of both the artistic and architectural qualities of a PGS work. In 
the case of a painted mural, the circumstances weigh against 
finding an integrated concept as defined in Leicester.  
Leicester states that PGS works may be part of an 
architectural work when they are designed to appear as part of 
the building.224 This is likely the sole factor applicable to the 
analysis of a painted work, as illusionistic, decorative painting 
can be a part of an architectural design scheme.225 However, an 
exterior mural that bears no relationship to the design scheme 
is distinguishable.226 Falkner makes note of this distinction and 
adds that the mural was painted after completion of the 
architectural structure.227 This reasoning suggests that this 
factor calls for an intentional design scheme, involving both 
architecture and painting.228 While this factor could weigh in 
favor of certain works within the same medium,229 it does not 
capture a non-contemporaneously painted PGS work like the 
one identified in Falkner.230  
 
 222. See id. (identifying repetition of architectural motifs in the streetwall 
towers and the building itself).  
 223. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (noting a lack of “matching 
decorative design elements, materials, and spacing”).  
 224. Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 225. See generally Apollo Spiliotis, Illusionism in Architecture: 
Anamorphosis, Trompe L’oeil and Other Illusionary Techniques from the 
Italian Renaissance to Today (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Manchester School of Architecture) (providing examples of illusionistic 
painting in Italian Renaissance architecture) (available at https://perma.cc
/5DUS-DZ6B). 
 226. See Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 937 (C.D. Cal. 
2018) (distinguishing Falkner’s mural from Leicester’s courtyard). 
 227. See id. at 937 (“There is also no indication that the mural was 
designed to appear as part of the building . . . .”).  
 228. See id. at 929 (noting the lack of directed design scheme).  
 229. See Spiliotis, supra note 225 (providing an example of illusionistic 
painting). 
 230. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (noting that the parking garage 
and accompanying building were both complete before Falkner began 
painting). 
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Perhaps the most important factor weighing against the 
separation of a PGS work from its architectural backdrop is 
whether that work has a functional purpose.231 This factor 
effectively separated the sculptural courtyard in Leicester from 
the PGS category by identifying functionality, the historically 
limiting factor in copyright protection.232 However, this factor is 
illogical when applied to painted works, as they are inherently 
non-functional.233 Falkner correctly identified the 
inapplicability of this factor.234  
In sum, the “test” distilled by Falkner is inconclusive.235 It 
provides a list of inapplicable factors in determining the 
copyright protection for a significant subclass of PGS works.236 
As Falkner identified, the application of Leicester to all PGS 
works forecloses a remedy for a group of artists who, but for 
 
 231. See Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1218 (identifying multiple functional 
purposes for the sculptural courtyard). The majority opinion states: 
As Professor Naidorf observed, the lantern towers and smoke 
towers that form the Figueroa streetwall as well as the smoke 
towers on the Eighth Street side of the building serve “the 
architectural and urban design purpose of defining the street 
frontage and enhancing the pedestrian level of the complex.” In 
addition, the Zanja Madre streetwall serves the functional purpose 
of channeling traffic into the courtyard, as metal gates, which open 
and close for control, latch onto the lantern towers.  
Id.  
 232. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  
 233. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 
[PGS] works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar 
as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are 
concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, 
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, 
and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article. (emphasis added). 
 234. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937.  
 235. See id. (denying defendant GM’s motion for summary judgment 
because the mural could not be declared part of the architectural structure as 
a matter of law). 
 236. See id. (finding an insufficient number of facts to support any of the 
four Leicester factors).  
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their selected canvas, would be protected under the Copyright 
Act.237 
In addition, Lewis illustrates the need for a new test to 
determine copyright protection for architecturally-situated PGS 
works. Ruling on the three defendants’ motions to dismiss 
Mercedes’ claim for declaratory judgment, the court in Lewis 
declined to distinguish Mercedes’s use of the three defendants’ 
murals from that of Warner Brothers’ use of Leicester’s 
sculptural courtyard.238 The court described each artist’s mural 
as “integrated into [the] building” and “a permanent fixture of 
the . . . cityscape.”239 This decision stands in opposition to 
Falkner, which noted a distinction between the sculpture at 
issue in Leicester and Falkner’s mural.240  
Moreover, the Lewis court did not explicitly address 
Falkner, even though Falkner is the sole opinion addressing the 
issue of copyright for an architecturally-fixed mural.241 In fact, 
the circumstances are entirely parallel.242 The incongruity of 
these opinions signals a lack of consensus regarding copyright 
protection for a subclass of PGS works.243 This lack of clarity is 
problematic as these lawsuits increase in number.244 To retain 
 
 237. See id. at 934 (explaining that the application of § 120(a) limits the 
copyright protection of PGS works attached to architecture).  
 238. See Mercedes Benz, USA v. Lewis, Nos. 19-10948, -10949, -10951, 
2019 WL 4302769, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2019) (analogizing Mercedes’s 
fair use claim with that of Warner Brothers in Leicester). 
 239. Id. at *1–2. 
 240. See Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 937 (C.D. Cal. 
2018) (“[T]he relevant facts in Leicester are entirely distinguishable from those 
here.”).   
 241. See Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769, at *5 (concluding its inquiry with no 
mention of Falkner). 
 242. Both cases concern artwork painted after completion of the 
architectural structure with no overarching design concept in relation to the 
structure. See id. at *1–2 (noting that the artists’ murals were painted during 
an arts festival); Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 929 (“Plaintiff was given no 
aesthetic to match and was not told of any function that the mural should 
play.”). 
 243. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (distinguishing Leicester), with 
Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769, at *5 (equating Leicester).  
 244. Benjamin Sutton, How Graffiti Artists Are Fighting Back Against 
Brands That Steal Their Work, ARTSY (Aug. 3, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://
perma.cc/G8TZ-AS67.  
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uniformity across the copyright system and to address an 
increasingly common issue, a clear test should be proposed.  
V.  Refining the Leicester Test 
To summarize, the Leicester test carries with it at best the 
risk of misapplication when used to determine copyright 
protection for non-sculptural street art.245 On one hand, as 
Judge Wilson points out when describing the mural at issue in 
the Falkner opinion, “very few if any of these [Leicester] factors 
appear to be present in the instant case.”246 There, the court 
applied the test, found it to be inconclusive, and ultimately 
separated the mural from the architectural structure.247 In 
contrast, the Lewis court found the Leicester test wholly 
inapplicable and therefore irrelevant to the possible exemption 
of those murals from the reach of § 120(a).248 Essentially, the 
artist prevails under Falkner but loses under Lewis.249  
No part of domestic copyright law indicates that pictorial 
representation should be allowed for PGS works, absent a 
showing of fair use.250 At most, a tension exists in regard to the 
application of § 120(a) due to the fine line between pure 
architecture and sculpture.251 Presented with the facts of 
Leicester, the Ninth Circuit concluded that this distinction was 
not significant enough to prevent the application of § 120(a), 
thus allowing the pictorial representation of a work arguably 
 
 245. See supra Part IV.D. 
 246. Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937. 
 247. See id. (concluding that the mural could not be considered “part of” 
the architectural structure as a matter of law). The court did not make a final 
determination as to the mural’s status under Leicester due to the procedural 
posture of the case. Id.  
 248. Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769, at *5 (“In sum, nothing in Leicester 
supports defendants’ argument that Mercedes does not have a claim under the 
AWCPA.”). 
 249. This statement should be qualified according to the procedural 
posture of both cases. Falkner denied defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment. Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937. Lewis concerned defendant artists’ 
motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment claim. Mercedes Benz, USA v. 
Lewis, Nos. 19-10948, -10949, -10951, 2019 WL 4302769, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 11, 2019). Neither case offered a decisive victory for either side. 
 250. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(5), 106(1) (providing copyright protection to 
PGS works, which includes the exclusive right of reproduction).  
 251. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.  
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resembling sculpture more than architecture.252 In addition, the 
majority concluded that the 1990 amendments foreclosed any 
possible application of a conceptual separability test, as those 
tests had been abrogated by statute.253 Although Leicester 
certainly limited copyright protection for PGS works affixed to 
architecture, Falkner indicates that its force is not absolute.254 
That is, under the correct factual circumstances, a court may 
still determine that PSG work is not “part of” an architectural 
work, thus worthy of independent copyright protection.255 
Drawing this division, however, may encourage courts to make 
aesthetic judgments regarding the blurred lines between 
artistic mediums.256 These judgments affect the uniformity of 
copyright and result in ad hoc determinations of what should be 
a federally standardized scheme.257 Thus, the circumstances for 
when to exempt certain architecturally-fixed PGS works from 
the Leicester holding should be clearly articulated. The question 
remains: how will courts know how to draw this distinction 
within the greater PGS category? 
The following inquiry aims to answer this question within 
the confines of Leicester.258 It offers guidance to courts who may 
otherwise find it improvident to make the distinction between 
non-sculptural street art and its architecturally-classified 
structural canvas.259 The purpose of the test is to 
 
 252. See Leicester v. Warner Bros, 232 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(considering Leicester’s contention that his work is sculptural, rather than 
architectural). 
 253. See id. at 1219–20 (discussing the legislative history of the 1990 Act).  
 254. See Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 937 (C.D. Cal. 
2018) (reasoning that a work must first be “part of” an architectural structure 
before § 120(a) applies). 
 255. See id. at 936 (“In sum, an important question appears to remain 
open, at least partially, after Leicester: whether conceptual separability 
applies in the context of architectural works.”). After making this statement, 
the opinion continues to analyze the application of the § 120(a) exemption, 
indicating that conceptual separability can be separated from the inquiry 
altogether. Id. at 936–37. 
 256. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  
 257. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (including pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works as an enumerated, copyrightable subject matter). 
 258. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 259. See, e.g., Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769, at *5 (rejecting the policy 
argument that the application of § 120(a) forecloses copyright protection for 
otherwise eligible works). 
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demonstrate — in clearer terms than the Leicester factors—that 
these works are not “part of” the architectural work and are 
therefore eligible260 for copyright protection, so long as they 
comply with the statutory requirements for PGS copyright.261 
A.  Creating the Proper PGS Subcategory 
The specific PGS works of authorship on which this test 
focuses must be narrowly delineated in order to propose a 
tailored solution to this issue in copyright law.262 This test does 
not purport to clarify the relationship between the pictorial 
representation exemption for architectural works under 
§ 120(a) and all PGS works affixed to architecture.263 Rather, 
this test should be used to properly classify a subset of PGS 
works as not “part of” the architectural structure upon which 
they were executed.264  
 
 260. The test ends with the conclusion that a work is or is not part of the 
architecture structure; in other words, whether the § 120(a) pictorial 
representation exemption applies. See infra Part V.B (discussing a new test 
for certain architecturally situated PGS works). Thus, the result of the test 
has no bearing on whether the pictorial representation infringed on the artist’s 
copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (applying only to architectural works). That 
inquiry would proceed under a fair use analysis. See id. § 107 (providing a list 
of factors to determine whether use of the work is permissible). 
 261. See id. §§ 101, 102(a)(8) (providing statutory requisites for PGS 
copyright eligibility).  
 262. This delineation should be made judicially; this Note does not argue 
that there should be a change in the existing statutory grouping. See id. 
§ 102(a)(5) (including PGS works as one category).  
 263. Scholars have already analyzed this angle. See, e.g., Fowles, supra 
note 69, at 343 (“By creating a bright-line rule, Congress spared future judges 
considering the copyrightability of PGS works attached to architectural works 
from choosing between numerous conceptual separability balancing tests and 
the resulting aesthetic judgments that contradict essential policy behind 
copyright law in their determinations.”); Orlandi, supra note 142, at 644–52 
(proposing a multifactor, equitable test to analyze PGS works that are 
incorporated into architecture). These articles look at whether there should be 
a bright line rule for PGS works as an entirety. 
 264. Both Leicester and Falkner use the term “part of” to describe a PGS 
work’s status of incorporation. See Leicester v. Warner Bros, 232 F.3d 1212, 
1219 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because the streetwall towers are part of the 
architectural work, § 120(a) applies.” (emphasis added)); Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 
3d at 937 (“The Court must . . . consider whether the mural is ‘part of’ the 
parking garage for the purposes of Section 120(a).” (emphasis added)). The 
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This subset of PGS works to which this test applies is 
commonly described as “street art.”265 However, by using this 
term for the works of authorship at issue in this test without 
further guidance, the exact contours of this PGS category are 
unclear.266 One scholar contends: “‘[S]treet art’ refers generally 
to visual art developed in public spaces including on private 
property, both sanctioned and unsanctioned . . . .”267 While this 
description is a helpful starting point, this definition needs 
clarifying parameters to narrow this category.268 First, street art 
is “visual art,” which is used consistent with its meaning 
provided in the Copyright Act.269 The Act requires that a “work 
of visual art” be a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture that 
exists in a single copy.270 There is no requirement that the work 
of visual art possess any aesthetic value or objective quality.271 
The Act excludes, among other things, “any poster, map, globe, 
chart, technical drawing, diagram model, applied art, motion 
picture or other audiovisual work . . . .”272 However, this test 
will disregard any three-dimensional work of visual art, e.g., 
 
application of this term is a distinct inquiry from conceptual separability, 
discussed infra. See Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1219 (independently examining 
Leicester’s conceptual separability argument).  
 265. John Fekner, a central figure in the street art movement, offers one 
example of a definition for this term: “all art on the street that’s not [merely] 
graffiti.” CEDAR LEWISOHN, STREET ART: THE GRAFFITI REVOLUTION 23 (1st ed. 
2008). Clearly, this definition includes a broad array of public works that may 
fall within Leicester’s precedent; as such, the definition should be further 
narrowed.  
 266. For example, under Fekner’s definition, street art could include 
sculptural art, which this Note will exclude from its inquiry. See infra Part 
V.A.1 (proposing a two-dimensionality requirement).  
 267. Griffin M. Barnett, Recognized Stature: Protecting Street Art as 
Cultural Property, 12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 204, 205 n.8 (2013). 
 268. Any art that is three-dimensional excluded from the PGS 
subcategory. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 269. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (stating what the term “visual art” includes and 
does not include). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Translated: the art does not have to be good. See Copyright Act of 
1909, 35 Stat. 1075 et seq. (1909) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq. 
(1942)) (replacing the term “works of fine art” with “works of art” to remove 
any indication of aesthetic valuation). 
 272. 17 U.S.C. § 101. These exclusions of functional works are important 
for the purposes of this Note. See supra Parts II.B.1, V.A.3 (exploring 
functionality in copyright law). 
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sculpture.273 The reason for this choice is twofold. First, the 
Leicester court has already developed an applicable test for 
sculptural works.274 Second, the propriety of the Leicester test 
has been properly explored by other sources.275  
The second parameter concerns the location of the work. 
For the § 120(a) exemption to apply, the work must be “located 
in or ordinarily visible from a public space.”276 Thus, a work that 
is questionably “part of” an architectural structure will fall 
outside the scope of this exemption if it does not meet these 
requirements.277 Moreover, the “public” nature of street art is 
exactly what makes these works vulnerable in the first place.278  
The preceding definition of “street art” is meant to clarify 
the circumstances under which the test should and should not 
apply. As such, the test proposed in this section should be 
presumed to apply only to street art that fits previously 
described parameters. Those parameters require the work to be 
two-dimensional, non-sculptural visual art, as described in 
§ 101 of the Copyright Act, that is located in or ordinarily visible 
from a public space, notwithstanding whether it exists on 
privately owned property.279 The term “non-sculptural street 
art” that is used throughout this section will imply that 
definition.  
 
 273. See infra Part V.A.2.  
 274. See generally Leicester, 232 F.3d 1212 (determining copyright 
protection for an incorporated sculptural work). 
 275. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.  
 276. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a).  
 277. An example of this would be any PGS work, such as a sculptural 
fountain, that exists on private property; if its location is outside the public 
view, then § 120(a) does not apply. Id.  
 278. For example, it would be more difficult for the infringement to occur 
if the art is on private property and the company advertising must first get 
permission to enter the property. If that is the case, then there is likely no 
§ 120(a) loophole, because the PGS work is not “located in or ordinarily visible 
from a public space.” Id. 
 279. See supra notes 269, 276 and accompanying text.  
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B.  An Alternative Test for Non-Sculptural Street Art 
As a threshold matter, it is necessary to reiterate the 
narrow applicability of this test to certain PGS works.280 This 
can be accomplished by distilling the factors that constitute the 
delineation among PGS works made under the previous 
Subpart. The following test should only be employed with works 
that fall within this PGS subcategory; otherwise, the Leicester 
analysis should be applied.281 The test is triggered with a 
showing that the work was not created contemporaneously282 
with the architectural structure or with a successful rebuttal of 
the presumption that attaches if it was created 
contemporaneously.283 Once this threshold element is met, the 
court should not use the Leicester factors. Rather, the court 
should determine whether the work is (1) two-dimensional and 
(2) non-functional.284 If those elements are met, then the work 
should retain independent copyright protection.285 
1.  Timing 
This threshold element requires the author to make a 
showing concerning timing in order for the PGS work to retain 
independent copyright protection. The author must 
demonstrate that the PGS work was created after the 
completion of the architectural work, or otherwise rebut a 
presumption that the work is part of the overall architectural 
 
 280. See Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1219–20 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(suggesting that sculpture is susceptible to architecture’s limited copyright 
protection).  
 281. See supra Part IV.D (analyzing the four Leicester factors).  
 282. “Contemporaneous” means that the PGS work was conceptualized 
before the completion of the architectural work. For example, the Leicester 
sculpture was created contemporaneously, while the Falkner mural was not. 
See Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1213–15 (describing the architectural and artistic 
collaboration between Leicester and the 801 Tower’s architect, John Hayes); 
Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 937 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (noting 
that the parking garage had already been completed by the time Falkner 
began his work). 
 283. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 284. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
 285. Otherwise, the work is likely to fall within the Leicester holding, and 
should be analyzed as such. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
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design.286 This threshold requirement is necessary for two 
reasons. The first is that it removes many of the possible 
functionality issues.287 Second, it prevents the premature 
application of the Leicester test.288 In addition, this element 
accords with the common conceptualization of street art, which 
is art that is usually added to an existing structure.289  
If a work is not created contemporaneously with the 
architectural structure, then the Leicester test should not 
apply.290 Falkner illustrates this reasoning.291 In contrast, if a 
work is created contemporaneously with the structure, it is 
more likely to be part of the “overall form as well as the 
arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the 
design’ of a building”292 and thus gives rise to a presumption 
that is “part of” the architectural work. In this case, the Leicester 
factors are applicable.293  
 
 286. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 929 (emphasizing the timing of the 
work).   
 287. See infra Part V.A.3. Many of the indicia of derivative functionality 
center around the idea of an integrated design concept. Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 
3d at 937. Falkner illustrates how the separation of a PGS work’s completion 
from the construction of the building remedies this issue: “Plaintiff was not 
instructed that the mural should play a functional role with respect to the 
parking garage or that the design of the mural should match design elements 
of the garage. Indeed, the architecture of the parking garage and accompanying 
building were already complete before [Falkner] started painting.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 288. There are instances where the Leicester test is helpful for 
two-dimensional works. See infra Part V.A.3 (discussing functionality). If the 
work is functional, then it fails this proposed test, but has met one of the 
factors of Leicester. In that case, the inquiry should continue under Leicester.  
 289. LEWISOHN, supra note 265, at 23. Again, this Note makes no 
distinction between permissive and non-permissive additions to buildings. 
 290. Once the remaining two elements are met, then Leicester becomes a 
useless inquiry. See supra Part IV.D (examining the applicability of the 
Leicester factors using a mural as a hypothetical); see also Falkner, 393 F. 
Supp. 3d at 937 (commenting on the absence of the factors in analyzing a 
two-dimensional, non-functional mural added after the completion of the 
architectural structure).  
 291. See Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (considering the Leicester factors 
of little relevance to the court’s conclusion).  
 292. Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 17 
U.S.C. § 101). 
 293. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
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The presumption is necessary because there are certain 
two-dimensional, non-functional PGS works that truly are 
conceived as “part of” an architectural structure.294 For example, 
consider painted (rather than sculptural) frieze adorning a 
Greek temple.295 The fact that it is two-dimensional and 
non-functional does not make it any less “part of” the 
architectural composition.296 In fact, a frieze is one of the 
requirements of a classical temple façade.297 The inquiry would 
not be resolved by the proposed test, because even elements that 
were two-dimensional and purely non-functional would still 
appear to be “part of” the architectural structure.298 The 
Leicester test is better suited for this inquiry, because it focuses 
on the architecture’s integrated concept.299 If, however, the 
Leicester test is inconclusive—that is, the court still does not 
consider the work to be “part of” the architectural 
structure—then the remaining elements of this refined test can 
be applied to reach a final conclusion.300  
 
 294. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.  
 295. For a description of the frieze, see HERBERT LANGFORD WARREN, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF CLASSICAL ARCHITECTURE 168 (1919).  
Upon the epistyle rests the frieze. This member is essentially a 
piece of wall. It is not a structurally necessary member of an order. 
It may be, and it often is, omitted, when the scale or proportion of 
the structure demands. It is usual, because in most cases it is 
necessary to give adequate height to the entablature without too 
great coarsening of its parts. As a piece of wall its function is to 
enclose and to support. Like the wall it may be either continuous, 
as it is in the Ionic order, or it may appear to be resolved into points 
of support. 
These modes of support were further divided into triglyphs and metopes. Id. 
The metopes were often painted. Id. at 170.  
 296. See id. (describing examples of necessary two-dimensional 
embellishments).  
 297. ALEXANDER TZONIS AND LIANE LEFAIVRE, CLASSICAL ARCHITECTURE: 
THE POETICS OF ORDER 43, 53 (1986). 
 298. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 299. In the frieze example, a painted metope within a frieze would satisfy 
the first three factors of Leicester. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
 300. If the frieze did not satisfy the Leicester factors, then its 
two-dimensional and non-functional characteristics would be enough to 
warrant independent copyright protection, even if it failed the threshold 
requirement of non-contemporaneous creation.   
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2.  Two-Dimensionality Requirement 
The PGS category includes “two-dimensional and 
three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, 
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, 
diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including 
architectural plans.”301 Clearly, there is no differentiation made 
within the statute based on whether a work is a 
two-dimensional mural or a three-dimensional structure.302 
However, a distinction should be created between the two types 
of PGS works to avoid the mischaracterization made in Lewis.303 
For example, many of the Leicester elements identified by 
Falkner offer little clarity when applied to a two-dimensional 
PGS work.304 The solution is simple: any three-dimensional PGS 
work should be analyzed under Leicester, while two-dimensional 
works should follow the inquiry proposed here.305  
 
 301. 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
 302. Id. 
 303. Mercedes Benz, USA v. Lewis, Nos. 19-10948, -10949, -10951, 2019 
WL 4302769, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2019) (describing each artist’s mural 
as “integrated into [the] building” and “a permanent fixture of 
the . . . cityscape”).  
 304. See supra Part IV.D. For example, it is highly unlikely that a 
two-dimensional work would be considered on its own an architectural feature.  
 305. The possibility of a mixed-media work complicates the test. In this 
case, the inquiry should be whether the work is predominantly 
three-dimensional or predominantly two-dimensional, according to the viewer. 
In other words, is it more akin to painting (or a comparable medium such as 
an etching or chalk work) or closer to sculpture? An illustration from the 
famous Paragone debate that ranged throughout the Renaissance may offer 
some guidance here on the difference between painting and sculpture: “Even 
a blind man could recognize and enumerate the details of a statue though his 
sense of touch, ergo it was more real than a painting which the blind man 
would experience as an incomprehensible, flat object.” Peter Hecht, The 
Paragone Debate: Ten Illustrations and a Comment, 14 NETH. Q. FOR HIS. ART 
125, 127 (1984). In addition, if three-dimensional elements of the work can be 
assessed separately from its two-dimensional elements, there is also the 
possibility of using separate tests for the work’s constituent parts.  
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3.  “Non-functional” Defined 
Works of authorship must be non-functional to qualify for 
PGS copyright protection.306 This requirement may eliminate 
some forms of street art, but should be considered separately 
from the analysis triggered by the possible application of 
§ 120(a).307 For example, a mural representing a map displays 
functional qualities.308 However, this type of functionality 
should be analyzed under an applicable conceptual separability 
test, because the functional elements at issue exist solely within 
the PGS work.309 Ultimately, if a work loses copyright protection 
on these grounds, there is no need to inquire as to the effects of 
§ 120(a). Because the inquiry goes directly to whether a work is 
eligible for PGS copyright protection in the first place, this type 
of functionality is unnecessary to explore under a § 120(a) 
application analysis.310 
However, some PGS works may also exhibit functional 
aspects when conceptualized with architecture.311 In Leicester, 
 
 306. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[PGS] works shall include works of artistic 
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian 
aspects are concerned . . . .”). Ostensibly, no such functionality bar exists for 
architectural works. See id. (defining architectural works).  
 307. See Fowles, supra note 69, at 210 (describing conceptual separability 
for PGS works).  
 308. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (using “map” as an example of visual art but 
limiting its protection by functionality).  
 309. Leicester abrogated any conceptual separability inquiry in the context 
of separating a PGS work from architecture, not conceptual separability for 
the PGS work itself. See Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (considering conceptual separability in the context of PGS works 
and architecture).  
 310. Instead, the inquiry would follow a conceptual separability test, the 
most recent example being the Supreme Court’s holding in Star Athletica:  
[A] feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible 
for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a 
two- or three- dimensional work of art separate from the useful 
article and (2) would qualify as a protectable [PGS] work—either on 
its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression—if it 
were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is 
incorporated.  
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).  
 311. This phenomenon precluded Leicester’s claim against Warner 
Brothers. See Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1218 (identifying various functional roles 
of the sculpture).  
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the court explored this form of symbiotic functionality and 
ultimately concluded that this characteristic barred the artist’s 
claim.312 Thus, the proper inquiry under this element would 
follow the reasoning of Leicester.313 There, the court disagreed 
with Leicester’s contention “that visual effects cannot impart 
usefulness.”314 Reasoning that “‘building’ includes structures 
‘that are used, but not inhabited by human beings,’”315 the 
majority concluded that “[S]ection 101’s protection of an 
‘architectural work’ extends to the ‘overall form as well as the 
arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the 
design’ of a building.”316 Accordingly, if a PGS work possesses 
characteristics that converge with the overall functionality of 
the architectural work, then visual effects may in fact impart 
usefulness.  
In Falkner, the court examined the imbued functionality of 
a painted mural by looking at whether the mural had any 
functional purpose related to the building.317 From Leicester, 
Falkner distilled two indicia of functional purpose: (1) whether 
the mural matched design elements of the architectural 
structure and (2) whether the artist was instructed to fulfill a 
functional design scheme.318 Under the first indicator, Leicester 
looked at material, height, positioning, and resemblance to 
architectural features of the structure.319 In addition, the court 
looked at the functional purpose of the work, which served “the 
architecture and urban design purpose of designing the street 
frontage and enhancing the pedestrian level of the complex.”320 
The court noted that this function “was not a creative aspect of 
Leicester’s work; it was an architectural element mandated by 
the Los Angeles CRA, which required structure with sufficient 
 
 312. See id. at 1219 (considering “powerful evidence that [the work is] part 
of the functional and architectural vocabulary of the building”). 
 313. See id. at 1217–19 (reviewing the reasoning of the district court).   
 314. Id. at 1218. 
 315. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-735, at 6952 (1990)). 
 316. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 317. See Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 937 (C.D. Cal. 
2018) (examining the relationship between the mural and the parking garage). 
 318. Id.  
 319. Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1218. 
 320. Id. 
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mass to establish the street edge and be no higher than three 
stories.”321 
Derivative functionality—i.e., functional qualities that only 
appear as a result of the PGS work’s proximity to 
architecture — is a product of these attributes.322 However, 
examining the list, it is unlikely that any of these qualities 
would be present in a PGS work that fits the parameters of this 
Note.323 This form of functionality is not inherent in 
two-dimensional works, and will most likely be satisfied by a 
sufficient showing under the second element of the test.324 It is 
more probable that functionality manifests in a manner that 
removes the work from PGS classification altogether.325 If that 
is the case, the inquiry should be conducted separately from this 
test.326 
The object of the test is to demonstrate that certain PGS 
and architectural works are not unified.327 As such, the test 
reveals whether there are two separate creations, rather than a 
work conceived as a whole.328 Leicester suggests that PGS works 
cannot be separated once found to be unitary.329 As such, any 
“separation” of a PGS work from its architectural surroundings 
must take place before this designation.330 This test performs 
 
 321. Id. 
 322. See Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(rejecting Leicester’s contention that his work “can’t become ‘functional’ simply 
because it is physically or aesthetically oriented to the 801 Tower”). 
 323. See supra note 319 and accompanying text. A two-dimensional work 
could perhaps consist of similar material, but that fact alone would be 
insufficient without other indicia. 
 324. See supra Part V.A (describing the narrow applicability of the test to 
PGS works).  
 325. See supra notes 303–305 and accompanying text.  
 326. Id. 
 327. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 328. See generally Leicester, 232 F.3d 1212 (emphasizing the concurrent 
conceptualization of Leicester’s sculpture with Hayes’ architectural work).  
 329. See id. at 1219 (declining to apply a conceptual separability test).  
 330. See id. (rejecting Leicester’s contention that conceptual separability 
is available to a unitary architectural work).  
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this function, but tailors the inquiry to a specific subclass of PGS 
works.331  
Moreover, creating a subclass within the greater PGS 
category is compatible with copyright law.332 Within the eight 
enumerated categories of copyrightable subject matter, there 
are distinct tests, even within a specific category.333 For 
example, courts have protected different types of written 
materials with different tests.334 This test separating PGS 
works is no different.  
In addition, this test harmonizes with principles of 
copyright law discussed previously.335 First, it aids courts in 
drawing the proper distinction within the PGS category that 
follows Leicester, while preserving proper copyright protection 
for non-functional PGS works.336 Drawing this division helps 
courts avoid aesthetic judgments on the blurred lines between 
artistic mediums.337 These judgments affect the uniformity of 
copyright and result in ad hoc determinations of what should be 
a federally standardized scheme.338 In addition, copyright is a 
form of economic subsidy.339 The misapplication of Leicester 
carries with it the risk of diminishing public art.340 That is, 
artists who know they will receive curtailed copyright protection 
solely due to their chosen canvas may take their work 
elsewhere. Copyright law is meant to foster a rich public 
 
 331. See Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 937 (C.D. Cal. 
2018) (correctly identifying a PGS candidate distinct from Leicester’s 
sculpture).  
 332. See supra Part IV.C (discussing whether Falkner’s exception 
comports with copyright law).  
 333. See generally Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 
1930) (considering copyright for plays); Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 
693 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing copyright for computer programming under 
written material).  
 334. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.  
 335. See supra Part II.A. (discussing aesthetic objectivity, moral rights, 
and economic subsidization).  
 336. See supra notes 327–331 and accompanying text.  
 337. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  
 338. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (including pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works as enumerated, copyrightable subject matter).  
 339. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.  
 340. See Orlandi, supra note 142 at 641–42 (“Our system of intellectual 
property has long been based on sound economic theory . . . .”).  
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domain: too broad an application of Leicester will have a literal 
impact on the public forum and the paintings within it.341  
VI.  Conclusion 
Street art is a commodified form of authorship, with a 
significant portion of its value realized through visual 
reproduction. Because of street art’s particularized canvas, i.e., 
the frequent association between street art and architecture, an 
otherwise protected work of authorship will be (and in two 
notable cases has already been) exploited because of the 
pictorial representation exemption. Recent litigation in two 
geographically distinct courts suggests that Leicester, litigated 
more than twenty years ago, may be too broadly applied to 
works whose copyright protection should not be curtailed by 
architecture’s incongruous copyright eligibility. While Falkner 
steered the inquiry in the right direction, Lewis demonstrates a 
need for clarity. Courts should consider elucidating the contours 
of Leicester to avoid encouraging the appropriation of another’s 
creative efforts. 
 
 341. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  
